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be outside the terms of the act, i.e., neither protected nor prohibited, the
state court would have jurisdiction to hear the employer's plea for state
relief.
JOSEPH D. BERMINGHAM, JR.
Labor Law—LMRDA Civil Enforcement Section—Local Union Officer
Has No Cause of Action in Tort Against District Union Officials in
Their Individual Capacities.—Tomko v. Hilbert. 1—Tomko, appellant,
commenced an action under Title I ("bill of rights") of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) 2 against Hilbert
and Kreheley, appellees, for damages and an injunction, alleging that ap-
pellees assaulted, libeled, and, by means of threats, force and disorderly con-
duct, interfered with his rights as a local union member and president by
disrupting the conduct of regular business meetings and regular business.
Appellees are both officials of the district union of which Tomko's local is
a part, but the complaint merely charged the appellees in their individual
capacities and did not allege that any labor organization, or any officer or
agent thereof acting in his official capacity, had violated the appellant's
rights under the "bill of rights." The United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania 3 dismissed the action on the ground that
the appellant had failed to exhaust his internal union remedies. On appeal
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. HELD: A local union
member and officer has no cause of action for damages and/or an injunction
against (district) union officials in their individual capacities absent diver-
sity jurisdiction. The majority of the Court of Appeals reached the con-
clusion that the LMRDA deals exclusively with the union-member relation-
ship after considering the language of the LMRDA, its purpose, the evils
it was intended to cure, and its legislative history. Judge Hastie concurred
on the ground that, although the record was not very clear, the conclusion
of the district court was warranted. Judge Hastie suggested that if the
district court were wrong the appellant should merely be given leave to plead
over.
There was no National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) jurisdiction
of this case because there were no facts alleged which would put it within
the ambit of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), sec-
tions 8(b) 8(6)(2), or 8(b) (5). 4
 The LMRA is operative in the area
of employer-employee-union relationships and concerns the action of these
groups as they affect wages, hours and conditions of employment.
Title I of the LMRDA, more popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin
Act, grants to every member of a labor organization the fundamental rights
to nominate candidates for election, to vote in organization elections, to
attend and participate in meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regu-
lations; 5
 to speak and assemble freely with other members and to express
1 288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961).
2
 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 411 (Supp. 1960).
3 46 L.R.R.M. 2853 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
4 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
5
 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (1) (Supp. 1960).
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any arguments, views, and opinions in and out of organization meetings,
subject to reasonable organization rules regarding member responsibility to
the organization as an institution;° to be free from increased dues, initi-
ation fees, and assessments except those enacted by a specified procedure; 7
to be free from any labor organization limitation on the member's right to
sue provided that reasonable internal hearing procedure (not to exceed a
four month lapse of time) is exhausted;° and to be free from improper
disciplinary action as defined in general terms by the act .° These rights
are enforcible by a civil action in a United States district court." Title I
of the act further provides that none of the provisions of the act shall limit
the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any
state, federal, or union law." Title I concludes by guaranteeing the right
of any labor organization member to receive a copy of any collective bar-
gaining agreement under which the organization is workingi° and by requir-
ing every labor organization to inform its member about the provisions of
the act."
The Court of Appeals paraphrased Title I of the LMRDA as set out
above and quoted two sections of the "Declaration of Findings, Purposes,
and Policy" to the effect that "Congress declared that 'the enactment of
the act is necessary to eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part
of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants and their offi-
cers and representatives . . .'." 14 These two elements the court considered
in conjunction with the statements of various Congressmen similar to that
made by Representative Derwinski:
... A bill of rights giving the rank-and-file union member full pro-
tection of his rights as a union member must be adopted. The
purpose of the bill of rights is to protect union members against
the rules and practices of some unions which effectively stifle
all expression of opposition to union bosses."
The court compared the Title I civil enforcement section with the Title II
civil enforcement section and concluded that "there is no indication here that
the substantive provisions of the bill of rights can be enforced against any
person as that term is defined in subsection 3(d)"" of the act. In con-
6 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (2) (Supp. 1960).
7 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (3) (Supp. 1960).
S 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 T.T.S.C.A. § 411(a) (4) (Supp. 1960).
9 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (5) (Supp. 1960).
10 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 412 (Supp. 1960).
11 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 413 (Supp. 1960).
12 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 414 (Supp. 1960).
13 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 415 (Supp. 1960).
14 288 F.2d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 1961).
15 Id. at 628. 105 Cong. Rec. 15700, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
16 Id. at 626. Title I, § 102, 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 412 (Supp. 1960),
provides: "Any person whose rights secured by the provisions have been infringed .. .
may bring a, civil action for such relief . . . as may be appropriate." Title II, § 210,
73 Stat 530 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 440 (Supp. 1960), provides: "Whenever it shall
appear that any person has violated . . . the Secretary may bring civil action for
such relief as may be appropriate."
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tract, noted the court, the Title II civil enforcement can be enforced by a
civil action against any person."
The Court of Appeals cited Strauss v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,18
 Jackson v. Martini° and Allen v. Armored Car Chauffers
Unioe° as recent decisions, which although involving different facts, fully
supported its interpretation of the LMRDA. (The Jackson and Allen cases
both cite and rely on the authority of the Strauss case.) But a later federal
district court case, Serio v. Liss, 21 took issue with the express holding of the
Strauss and Martin cases and inferentially with the Allen case when it held
that a federal district court had jurisdiction under the LMRDA to deter-
mine whether a local union business agent was improperly threatened with
loss of his job under an allegedly erroneous construction of section 504(a) of
the LMRDA. The Strauss case reached the conclusion that a local union
business agent has rights under the LMRDA against the union on facts
substantially the same as those in the Serio case. The court which decided
the Strauss case based its result on the fact that the status of the parties
was that of employee-employer and that the LMRDA did not cover such
a situation. The Strauss court construed the act to a greater extent than
was necessary to reach the decision it did. Therefore, the instant case must
rest its validity on its own construction of the LMRDA and on other facts
in its legislative history which the court did not consider.
The LMRDA emerged in its final form after a tortuous legislative
history which began before consideration of the so-called Kennedy-Erwin
bill in 1958.22
 Every thread leading to the enactment of the. Title I civil
enforcement section shows that Congress was primarily interested in pre-
venting continuous misdeeds by labor organizations and their officials against
organization members. Each stage in the evolution of this section has
reference to an injunctive form of relief against the wrongdoers. 23 At one
stage in the evolution of the act, the Secretary of Labor was to be em-
powered to seek injunctions against violators of the act. 21
 But the forth-
right Senator Johnston from South Carolina quickly pointed out that this
would mean that the federal government would be in position to enforce
racial integration in labor organizations in the South and that the act
17
 Sec Rekant v. Rubinowitz, 194 F. Supp. 194 (ED. Pa. 1961), which indicates
that the court correctly construed this clause.
18
 179 F. Supp. 297 (ED. Pa. 1959). A federal district court does not have
jurisdiction under LMRDA § 102 of action by union business agent against union
for wrongful discharge, where business agent alleges that union misconstrued LMRDA
§ 504.
19 180 F. Supp. 475 (D, Md. 1960).
20 185 F. Supp. 492 (D. N.J. 1960).
21
 189 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.J. 1961). Federal district court has jurisdiction under
LMRDA (presumably § 102) to determine whether local union business agent has right
to continue in office under LMRDA § 504. This case is directly contrary to a statement
made by Senator Kennedy during debate on the LMRDA. n22 See generally Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union
Members, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 199, 201 (1960).
23 Legislative History of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 521, 631-32, 700-01, 879-80
(1959).
24 Id. at 308, 1102(2).
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would become a pervasive Fair Employment Practice Code." Northern
liberals who did not wish to see labor under the heel of the federal govern-
ment and southern Senators made common cause to modify the bill to pro-
vide for civil enforcement by individuals harmed by violators of the act."
During debate following the modification it was noted that the injured
parties would have the right to injunctions and to whatever slight damages
they had suffered.27 The original conception of Congress was that the injury
was being inflicted on the public and that were it not for the pervasive
effect of federal enforcement power, the enforcement power would have been
lodged there.
The Title I retention of existing rights section was added to the act
to make it clear that the LMRDA was not to supplant existing federal or
state civil action rights, but that the act was designed to add new rights
and to clarify federal law on this issue° Congress realized that individuals
were well protected by local law, but the status of the individual in the
group was unclear.
While it might be argued that the "bill of rights" section is drafted to
give some rights to labor organization members and to withdraw organization
power in some circumstances," it must be noted that all granted rights are
exercisable in a group and that every clause has a restriction which permits
the vesting of considerable power in the group. For example, the equal
rights section of the LMRDA grants equal rights only within such labor
organization,30
 a clear indication that the provisions are enforcible only
against the group under the LMRDA.
The inevitable conclusion is that the court decided this case, which
delineates an important title of the LMRDA, correctly. A union member
has no rights in a federal court for damages and/or injunctive relief against
a violator of the LMRDA who allegedly acted only in his individual ca-
pacity and not as the agent of any labor organization or employer. The
appellant, by such adverse judgments, is not precluded from bringing a tort
action against the appellees in a state court; nor is he precluded from
reinstituting his case in a federal district court under the LMRDA, but he
25
 Id. at 1223(3).
26 Id, at 1294(3).
27
 Id. at 1281(1).
28 Id, at 1108-19. These pages record a long debate among Senators Kennedy,
Clark, Curtis, McClellan, Morse and others which led to the inclusion in the McClellan
amendment of a modification (at 1114) which was the beginning of the present
Retention of Existing Rights Section. Senator Kennedy was particularly worried
that ". . . if the proposal (the McClellan Amendment to the Kennedy-Ervin bill with
the civil enforcement rights vested in the Secretary of Labor) were enacted, the
present rather exhaustive common law of the various states might be wiped out, and
only the rights suggested by the Senator from Arkansas would then be available to
union members." The Senators agreed that the solution to the federal preemption prob-
lem was the enaction of the Retention of Existing Rights Section.
29 Compare LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1)
(Supp. II, 1958), with LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 4I1(a)(4) (Supp. II, 1958). The former is phrased "every member" while the
latter is phrased "no labor organization shall."
30 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1958).
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must allege that appellees acted in their capacities as union officials. Judge
Hastie's concurring opinion seems correct in so far as it would grant the
appellant leave to plead over.
DAVID S. WORONOFF
Labor Law—Seniority Rights As Vested Contractual Rights.—Zdanok
v. Glidden Company, Durkee Famous Foods Div.'—In a diversity action
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, five employees
sued their former employer for breach of contract. The dispute concerned
itself with the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
covering a New York plant which the employer had closed when it trans-
ferred its operation to Pennsylvania. Pursuant to the agreement, the
employer terminated the contract and offered the employees the chance
to apply for similar positions in Pennsylvania, but without seniority
benefits. When arbitration failed to resolve the resultant seniority dispute,2
the employees brought this action alleging a denial of valuable contract
rights that had vested in them.
The district court held that the plaintiffs had standing as beneficiaries
of the bargaining agreement to enforce provisions made for their benefit,
but that the employer was not required to preserve for its employees
seniority status acquired under the expired New York agreement. 2 On
plaintiff's appeal, this ruling was reversed. HELD: The seniority rights
were vested and were not lost when the agreement expired; accordingly,
the employees had seniority rights after the employer transferred the
plant from New York to Pennsylvania. }
The collective bargaining agreement in this case recited, in its preamble,
that it was made "for and on behalf of its plant facilities located at Corona
Avenue and 94th Street, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York."'" Judge
Madden of the United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation, 6
in speaking for the majority found that this geographical description was
nothing more than an identifying address and would not be treated as
setting fixed boundaries on the scope of the contract.? The court concluded
I 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 82 Sup. Ct. 56 (1961) (No. 242).
2 Local 852, the plaintiffs' union, served on the defendant a notice of intention to
arbitrate certain designated disputes, pursuant to the arbitration provision in the union's
contract with the defendant. Defendants' motion to stay arbitration was granted on the
grounds that there was no arbitrable dispute. The court concluded its opinion with the
sentence: "It follows from all the foregoing that Glidden's motion to stay arbitration
must be granted, whatever other remedies the Union may have with respect to the
alleged disputes." Matter of General Warehousemen's Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700, 172
N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
3 185 F. Supp. 441 (1960).
4 Supra note 1.
5 Id. at 103.
Judge Madden, who not only participated in the 2 to 1 finding but wrote the
opinion, was sitting by special designation of Mr. Chief Justice Warren.
7 A rational construction of the contract would seem to require that the state-
ment of location was nothing more than a reference to the then existing situa-
tion, and had none of the vital significance which the defendant would attach
to it. Contracts must, in all fairness, be construed ut res magis valeat quam
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